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Abstract— This paper describes the methodology and value of 
modifying allocations to reliability and maintainability 
requirements for the NASA Ground Systems Development and 
Operations (GSDO) program’s subsystems. As systems 
progressed through their design life cycle and hardware data 
became available, it became necessary to reexamine the 
previously derived allocations. This iterative process provided 
an opportunity for the reliability engineering team to reevaluate 
allocations as systems moved beyond their conceptual and 
preliminary design phases. These new allocations are based on 
updated designs and maintainability characteristics of the 
components. It was found that trade-offs in reliability and 
maintainability were essential to ensuring the integrity of the 
reliability and maintainability analysis. This paper discusses the 
results of reliability and maintainability reallocations made for 
the GSDO subsystems as the program nears the end of its design 
phase. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
Acronyms 
MTBF   Mean Time Between Failure  
MTTR  Mean Time to Repair 
RBD   Reliability Block Diagram 
RMA  Reliability, Maintainability, Availability 
Symbols 
λ   Constant Failure Rate 
μ   Constant Repair Rate 
t   Mission Time 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Subsystems under NASA’s Ground Systems Development 
and Operations (GSDO) program located at the Kennedy 
Space Center (KSC) have evolved to support future space 
programs, serving both NASA’s missions for the Space 
Launch System (SLS) and commercial opportunities. GSDO 
requires a safe, reliable, maintainable, and available complex 
system of subsystems to successfully support launch 
activities.  In order to achieve this, a launch  
availability requirement must be established and decomposed 
to reliability and maintainability requirements that are then 
allocated to each subsystem based on their complexity and 
contribution to each launch attempt. The reliability, 
maintainability, and availability (RMA) analysis for each 
subsystem verifies these requirements. Reliability allocations 
are determined by GSDO program goals, predicted 
performance from previous programs, and historical 
performance of legacy subsystems and components. The 
reliability engineer must also consider the maintainability 
characteristics of each subsystems and its components to 
determine what, if any, trade-offs are needed between 
reliability and maintainability to reach the availability 
requirement. The mean time to repair (MTTR) is of particular 
interest to the reliability team, because unlike other forms of 
downtime (e.g., preventative maintenance, administrative 
and logistic delay times), these values can be quantitatively 
predicted and analyzed in the design phase. This paper 
discusses how allocations were initially created and then 
adjusted as GSDO evolved through its design life cycle. 
2. GSDO LAUNCH AVAILABILITY  
GSDO subsystems along with the SLS and Orion programs 
have been allocated a Launch Probability Technical 
Performance Measure (TPM) to ensure the success of future 
missions. Currently, the Launch Probability for the overall 
architecture is to be no less than 90% for each launch attempt 
[1]. This was then in turn allocated to each of the programs, 
as shown in Figure 1. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160003132 2019-08-31T04:09:14+00:00Z
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Figure 1 – GSDO Launch Probability & Availability  
For the GSDO Reliability Team, the Launch Probability 
allocation was decomposed to two requirements, Inherent 
Launch Availability and Operational Availability. As shown 
in Figures 1 and 2, these allocations were further decomposed 
to reliability and maintainability requirements for the GSDO 
subsystems. 
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Figure 2 - GSDO RMA Subsystem Allocations 
Inherent Launch Availability is defined as all the subsystems 
that are required to support and actualize a successful launch. 
The availability requirement states that GSDO will have an 
inherent launch availability of at least 98% at the end of a 24 
hour period for any single launch attempt. Operational 
Availability is defined as all the subsystems that are required 
to repair and support systems after a launch scrub is called 
which could require a launch vehicle roll back scenario to the 
Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). The operational 
availability requirement states that GSDO will have an 
operational availability of at least 80% with a timeframe of 
360 hours, beginning with the start of the first launch attempt 
plus 14 days prior to the next launch attempt. This definition 
of operational availability contrasts with the definition found 
in the literature, which includes forms of downtime 
associated with all maintenance tasks. The inherent launch 
availability requirement has not changed while the 
operational availability requirement has been updated since 
the RMA effort began [2]-[3]. The methodology used to 
achieve these requirements has been updated to reflect the 
current status of subsystem designs. 
3. ALLOCATIONS 
The previous allocation methodology used historical data 
from prior programs and subsystem subject-matter expertise 
in combination with common reliability allocation techniques 
to ensure conformance with launch probability and 
availability requirements. As systems progressed through 
their design life cycle and more data became available with 
the supplier hardware, it became necessary to reexamine the 
previously derived allocations. Allocating is an iterative 
process; as systems moved beyond the conceptual and 
preliminary design phases there was an opportunity for the 
Reliability Engineering Team to reevaluate allocations based 
on updated designs and maintainability characteristics of 
components.  
One factor for reallocating requirements was the number of 
systems under analysis. The previous allocation methodology 
[2] included 42 subsystems under analysis for Inherent 
Launch Availability and 12 subsystems for Operational 
Availability; these numbers have been updated to 37 
subsystems for Inherent Launch Availability and 14 for 
Operational Availability. As subsystem designs progressed, 
it was determined that some subsystem’s components were 
absorbed by other subsystems and others were found to be 
essential to Operational Availability rather than Inherent 
Launch Availability. 
Another factor was the increase in hardware as subsystems 
reached their final design reviews. The original allocations 
were based on preliminary designs and did not account for 
additional components and changes to the launch architecture 
(e.g., flight vehicle, ground systems). As the program 
approached its critical design milestone, eighteen subsystems 
were not meeting their requirements. This high number led 
the team to consider whether the initial requirement was 
incorrect or whether reallocations were necessary. It is 
recommended in practice that major design changes, 
including modifications to the system architecture, warrant 
reassessment of the reliability and maintainability 
allocations. However, there is a lack of case studies in the 
literature verifying this suggestion. Allocation models that 
include both reliability and maintainability parameters are 
also absent from the literature [4]. During reallocation, trade-
offs between reliability and maintainability were essential to 
ensure the integrity of RMA analyses. For example, four 
recommended techniques for allocating maintainability did 
not apply to GSDO subsystems [5], [6]; these methods are 
recommended early in the design phase and do not reflect the 
current status of GSDO system designs which vary in 
complexity and operation. There is support in the literature 
for modifying allocation methods when considering system 
or component complexity, though unique methods can be 
system hierarchy dependent and not applicable to other 
designs [7]. 
4. METHODOLOGY  
Software 
The GSDO RMA Team uses PTC’s Windchill Quality 
Solutions (WQS) (formerly Relex) software tool for analysis. 
WQS is a reliability analysis tool that uses common standards 
for reliability prediction, contains databases of failure data for 
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mechanical, electrical, and electromechanical assemblies, 
and uses numerical methods to provide results for RMA 
analyses. There are limitations to the software analysis tool. 
Within the capability of WQS, and in order to maintain 
consistency across all analyses, all calculations were made 
assuming exponential distribution for failure and repair data. 
The RMA Team uses two of WQS’s modules for analysis: 
Reliability Prediction and Reliability Block Diagrams 
(RBD).  
The user can create parts lists in the Reliability Prediction 
module for all components in the subsystem under analysis, 
either by entering user-defined data or using the software’s 
prediction libraries. This module assigns failure rates to each 
part using various methods. WQS uses MIL-HDBK-217F 
parts count methodology to assign failure rates. The software 
does have the capability to use newer methods such as 
217Plus, which requires several pieces of additional 
information, such as operating temperature and other 
environmental factors. This data is difficult to collect for all 
subsystems during the design phase but can be collected 
during the testing and validation phases. To maintain 
consistency between the analyses MIL-HDBK-217F is used 
for calculations.  
The RMA Team enters user-defined data when manufacturer 
failure rate or MTBF are published; also when available, 
historical failure rates can be entered into the component list. 
The Non-electronic Parts Reliability Database (NPRD), 
Electronic Parts Reliability Database (EPRD), and other 
ancillary handbooks are used for RMA analysis. The NPRD 
and EPRD libraries use field failure rate data; these libraries 
are also incorporated into the software used for analysis, 
when manufacturer or historical data is not available. These 
capabilities allow the RMA Team to develop a complete parts 
library for the subsystem under study from a variety of 
reputable sources. 
The primary modeling tool for analysis is the RBD. The 
configuration of the components within the RBD reflects the 
functionality of the subsystem and accounts for redundancy 
and backup systems. For subsystems that have built in 
redundancy in to their design, an RBD can also demonstrate 
the logical connection between components. Generally, the 
larger and more complex a subsystem design is, the larger the 
RBD model will be. An RBD does not represent the physical 
location or configuration of components; only components 
that are required to function for the successful performance 
of a subsystem are included. All results of RMA analyses are 
derived from the WQS’s RBD module.  
RBDs can be modeled in multiple layers of single and parallel 
configurations. RBDs can also be modeled in multiple 
configurations: series, parallel, or series-parallel. At the 
subsystem level, the RBD models are a combination of these 
options. At the top level RBD which represents all GSDO 
subsystems, systems are modeled serially and are mutually 
independent of one another. For the Inherent Launch 
Availability requirement, failure of any of the 37 subsystems 
will result in a launch scrub scenario. 
WQS uses Monte-Carlo probabilistic simulation to generate 
the reliability and availability measures with an analyst 
choice of 1,000,000 iterations and a statistical confidence of 
95%. The results of the Monte-Carlo simulations are used to 
report calculated measures of RMA to the design teams. 
Reliability Allocations 
The concise definition for reliability is the probability that an 
item (e.g., subsystem, component) will perform its intended 
function with no failures during a given period of time under 
specified operation conditions. Reliability is expressed, in 
equation (1), as the probability that a system (or component) 
will fail at or after a predetermined time t,  
𝑅(𝑡) = Pr{𝑇 ≥ 𝑡}                           (1) 
In general, failures that occur randomly or by chance events 
are modeled by the exponential distribution. This distribution 
is also known as the Constant Failure Rate model, meaning 
components fail at a constant rate independent of component 
design, operating time, and age [8]. For reusable launch 
systems, like those being analyzed independent analyses of 
historical data have determined that failure data can follow 
the exponential distribution [5]. The reliability equation, as 
expressed in (2), for the exponential distribution is 
𝑅(𝑡) =  𝑒−𝜆𝑡                                  (2) 
where λ is the subsystem or component failure rate and t is 
the mission time [8]. Failure rate is also expressed, in 
equation (3), as the reciprocal of the Mean Time Between 
Failure (MTBF). MTBF represents the average time an item 
is operational between failures. 
𝜆 =  
1
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹
                                    (3) 
In order to accurately model subsystems, components are 
chosen that most closely resemble parts found in the 
subsystem under study. For RMA analysis, failure rate data 
(λ or MTBF) is supplied by the manufacturer, through 
prediction part libraries, ancillary handbooks, or historical 
data from previous programs. Prediction part libraries are 
depositories of parts and assemblies failure rates collected 
from multiple sources.  
When modeled serially, the product of all subsystem 
reliabilities, expressed in equation (4), will determine the 
reliability of GSDO subsystems.    
𝑅𝐺𝑆𝐷𝑂 =  Πi=1
n 𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑅1 ∗ 𝑅2 ∗ … 𝑅𝑛          (4) 
Since there was a change in the number of subsystems under 
analysis, including the number of components, reliability 
requirements were reallocated to each subsystem. The 
measures for reliability and availability are commonly 
expressed in terms of 9s. For example, the values of 
reliability allocations that subsystems are required to meet 
range from two-9s (0.99) to over three-9s (0.999), meaning 
they are expected to be 99% or 99.9% reliable. 
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Maintainability Allocations 
Maintainability is a design parameter which describes the 
ability of a subsystem to be restored or repaired to an 
operational state within a given time period. Maintenance is 
the action to restore or repair a system to an operational state. 
Maintainability is expressed, in equation (5), as the 
probability that a system (or component) can be repaired at 
or before a predetermined time t, 
𝑀(𝑡) = Pr {𝑇 ≤ 𝑡}                           (5) 
The inclusion of maintainability in subsystem design can 
reduce system downtime by decreasing the Mean Time to 
Repair (MTTR). There are four subsets to system downtime: 
corrective maintenance, preventative maintenance, 
administrative delay time, and logistics delay time [9], [10]. 
The RMA analysis at this time only includes corrective 
maintenance time. It is a challenge, and not a recommended 
practice, to predict estimates for preventative maintenance 
and delay times; the greatest variability in time exists during 
these actions. A general corrective maintenance cycle can 
include many phases from when the failure occurs to when 
the repair is completed. The phases of corrective maintenance 
under analysis included: fault detection, localization and 
isolation, disassembly, repair or replacement, reassembly, 
and functional checkout [9]. MTTR is considered equivalent 
to mean corrective maintenance time, which is the 
unscheduled maintenance tasks to restore a system to an 
operational state as a result of system failure. For GSDO, 
MTTR estimates assume that fault detection and localization 
have been made and the failure mechanisms are known. The 
RMA Team is concerned with the time frame between 
disassembly and functional checkout, as shown in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3 - Corrective Maintenance Cycle 
Many of the GSDO subsystems contain legacy hardware and 
the numerous upgrades to subsystems are similar in 
accessibility and maintainability compared to their 
predecessors. Therefore, there is a strong case for 
quantitatively predicting correct maintenance for subsystem 
components. These factors combined with subject matter 
expertise from operations engineers involved with subsystem 
upgrades and available historical data from repair reports 
provided the RMA Team with conservative, yet realistic 
estimates for MTTR. The RMA Team initially uses their best 
engineering judgment for MTTR estimates based on a three-
shift, 24-hour operation for launch activities. For example, 
the initial estimate for a faulty solenoid valve which is to be 
removed and replaced, would be 8 hours (one shift). This 
estimate would then be submitted to the subsystem operations 
and design engineers for verification. Adjustments were 
made based on input of subject matter expertise.  
Maintainability is the counterpart of reliability, both are 
contributors to availability. The goal of maintainability is to 
reduce life cycle costs by preventing a “design it now and fix 
it later” conflict. Historically, repair times have been modeled 
using the lognormal distribution. For reusable launch ground 
systems, like those being analyzed, independent analyses of 
historical data have determined that repair times can follow 
either a lognormal or exponential distribution [11]. For 
subsystem analyses, software limitations only allow for an 
exponential distribution for repair data. 
Assuming constant repair rates (or exponential distribution) 
for subsystem components, the probability of completing a 
repair in time t or less can be determined. The maintainability 
function, in equation (6), for an exponential distribution of 
repair times is  
𝑀(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒−𝜇𝑡                            (6) 
where μ is the constant repair rate and t is the allocated time 
to repair for the subsystem. The constant repair rate is also 
expressed as the reciprocal of MTTR as expressed in equation 
(7), 
𝜇 =  
1
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
                                    (7) 
The maintainability function determines the probability of 
completing a repair within a specified time [10]. In general, a 
maintainability allocation generates an MTTR for each 
subsystem using one of these recommended methods: failure 
rate complexity allocation, equal allocation, and statistically-
based calculated allocation [5]. The equal allocation method 
could not be used for GSDO; this method assumes that an 
MTTR allocation is independent of a subsystems failure rate 
and can be distributed equally among the subsystems. This is 
not feasible because GSDO subsystems vary in complexity 
such as ease of access, type of repairable components, and 
type of subsystem. For example, some GSDO subsystems are 
strictly electrical subsystems, while others are a combination 
of electrical, mechanical and electromechanical subsystems. 
The statistically based allocation method is not applicable 
either; this method assumes a lognormal distributions for 
repair times. The failure rate complexity method, while 
practical, assumes that subsystems with the lowest reliability 
will be assigned the lowest MTTR values. In reality, a 
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complex system of systems will include a variation of low 
and high reliability systems with a variety of component and 
aggregate subsystem MTTRs.  
For GSDO, it would have been impractical to assign MTTR 
values using one of these methods. Therefore, MTTR values 
were reallocated based on type of system, ease of access, and 
the weighted failure rate of components. An internal analysis 
of historical ground system delay times determined that the 
MTTR for ground systems is about 50 hours. Using this 
estimate as a guide and with subject matter expertise input, 
subsystems which contain a majority of mechanical or 
electro-mechanical hardware were assigned higher MTTR 
values than electrical subsystems. Mechanical subsystems 
were allocated a maximum MTTR of 30 hours. Electrical 
subsystems which contain quick remove and replace 
hardware were allocated the lowest MTTR values, between 
15 and 20 hours. To calculate the total MTTR for a subsystem 
(𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑆𝑆), the MTTR for each component is weighted 
against the individual component’s failure rate. The mean 
time to repair is expressed in equation (8) as  
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑆𝑆 =  
𝛴(𝜆𝑖∗𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑖)
𝛴𝜆𝑖
                            (8) 
where the 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑆𝑆 is calculated using each ith component’s 
failure and repair data [9]. This approach is also used to 
determine the MTTR for all GSDO subsystems, as expressed 
in equation (9), 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑆𝐷𝑂 =  
𝛴(𝜆𝑆𝑆∗𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑆𝑆)
𝛴𝜆𝑆𝑆
                     (9) 
The MTTR for a subsystem or component represents the 
average number of hours for a component or subsystem to be 
restored to an operational state after an unexpected failure.   
Availability Allocations 
Availability, which is a function of reliability and 
maintainability, is the probability that a repairable subsystem 
will operate satisfactorily at a given point in time during the 
period of analysis. There are many ways of expressing 
availability, whether inherent or operational. It is the goal of 
the RMA Team to produce relevant and best estimates for 
how subsystems will operate at the critical point during 
launch countdown (i.e., at the time of launch or T-0). Inherent 
Availability is the probability that a system will perform 
satisfactorily at any given time under specific operating 
conditions in an ideal support environment. Typically, 
Steady-State Inherent Availability is expressed in equation 
(10) as  
𝐴 =  
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹+𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
=
µ
𝜇+𝜆
=
𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒+𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
             (10) 
where uptime and downtime are considered the basic 
statistics for assessing a system’s performance [8]. For 
GSDO, the performance specification is measured at 24 or 
360 hours. Therefore, in order to assess a subsystem’s design, 
the point (or instantaneous) availability is used. When both 
the failure distribution and the repair distribution are based 
on the exponential distribution, point availability is expressed 
in equation (11) as 
𝐴(𝑡) =  
𝜇
𝜆+𝜇
+
𝜆
𝜆+𝜇
𝑒−(𝜆+𝜇)𝑡                    (11) 
where μ is the subsystem’s repair rate, λ is the subsystem’s 
failure rate, and t is the specified mission time or point in time 
for the subsystem to be available. As with reliability, when 
modeled serially, the product of all subsystem availabilities, 
as expressed in equation (12), will determine the availability 
of GSDO subsystems.     
𝐴𝐺𝑆𝐷𝑂 =  Πi=1
n 𝐴𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐴1 ∗ 𝐴2 ∗ … 𝐴𝑛        (12) 
Using equation (12), will also verify the Inherent Launch 
Availability and Operational Availability requirements.   
5. REALLOCATIONS 
As the GSDO program approached its critical design 
milestone, eighteen subsystems were not meeting their 
requirements. The RMA Team researched whether the initial 
requirement was incorrect or whether reallocations were 
necessary. As stated earlier, one determinant for reallocating 
requirements was the number of systems under analysis. The 
previous effort [2] included more subsystems under analysis 
for Inherent Launch Availability. Currently there are 37 
subsystems under analysis compared to 42 subsystems. As 
the designs progressed, it was determined that some 
subsystems and components were absorbed by others or were 
found to be essential to Operational Availability rather than 
Inherent Launch Availability.  
 
Comparisons between the former and current reallocations 
for Inherent Launch Availability are shown in Figures 4-6. 
Using equations (2), (9), and (11) determined the values for 
RMA in Figures 4-6. In Figure 4, initial allocations were 
distinctly higher than initial GSDO results. An independent 
and analytical assessment of the subsystem allocations was 
conducted to verify the validity of the requirement. Once 
complete, GSDO subsystems were reallocated reliability 
requirements based on changes to the launch architecture (i.e. 
change in the number of systems under analysis, increase in 
the number of components). 
 
In Figure 5, initial allocations were made to maintainability 
requirements using an adjustment factor based on 
maintenance design characteristics such a field experience 
and fault isolation techniques [2]. The RMA Team 
determined this method did not apply uniformly across all 
subsystems and reallocated maintainability using a weighted 
MTTR based on the component’s failure data, type of 
subsystem (electrical or mechanical), and accessibility limits.  
Using equation (9) to determine the overall GSDO MTTR, 
this method also aligned with the calculated measures 
produced by the WQS software. 
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Figure 4 - GSDO Reliability  
 
 
Figure 5 - GSDO Maintainability  
The GSDO availability requirement states that GSDO will 
have an inherent launch availability of 98% at the end of a 24 
hour period for any single launch attempt. Using equation 
(11), the overall GSDO Inherent Launch Availability can be 
determined using each subsystem’s calculated measures for 
reliability and maintainability; the results are plotted in 
Figure 6. The reallocations and decrease in the number of 
subsystems under analysis has positively contributed to 
meeting the overall (0.98) availability requirement. 
 
 
Figure 6 - GSDO Availability 
For GSDO, reallocating reliability and maintainability 
requirements was an essential part of the design life cycle. It 
is the RMA Team’s goal to produce relevant and best 
estimates for how subsystems will operate at the critical point 
during a launch attempt. The goal of these analyses are to 
minimize the total operating costs and increase system 
effectiveness for GSDO.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
As NASA’s missions are further developed, a robust ground 
systems architecture is needed. The RMA Team analyzes 
GSDO subsystems to quantitatively determine if subsystems 
will meet the Inherent Launch Availability and Operational 
Availability requirements. These requirements exist to ensure 
that ground systems are safe, reliable, maintainable, and 
available to successfully support launch activities. The team 
provides recommendations to design teams with the intent to 
ensure that the design meets program level requirements. The 
RMA analysis is intended to verify that upgrades in design, 
in combination with legacy systems, meet the RMA 
allocations. If a subsystem is unable to meet its allocations, 
the RMA Team will consult with the design team’s engineers 
to determine if a design change is feasible or a suitable 
operational workaround exists. When multiple subsystems 
were not meeting their requirements, an opportunity existed 
to determine whether the requirement was incorrect or 
reallocation was necessary. The RMA Team determined that 
significant increases in the number of components and 
changes to the launch architecture since the effort began 
required the team to reassess the allocations.  
As stated at the beginning of this paper, it is recommended in 
practice that any design changes including modifications to 
the system architecture warrant reallocation of requirements. 
After reassessing GSDO subsystems, the following 
recommendations are offered: 
• Any increase in the number of components without 
a change in the design strategy (e.g., quality of 
hardware, redundancy) will result in a change in the 
calculated measures for reliability and 
maintainability. This will affect the calculated 
availability; therefore, reallocation should be 
considered.  
• Using hardware that historically has higher failure 
rates and are considered single points of failure (e.g., 
valves, transducers) will have an impact on the 
estimated reliability of the subsystem. 
• Significant changes to the system architecture, such 
as the addition or removal of subsystems will affect 
the overall calculated availability requirement; 
therefore, reallocation should be considered. 
7. FORWARD WORK  
In order to verify and validate the GSDO requirements, it is 
essential that the RMA Team continues to be involved in the 
testing and integration activities leading up to system 
certification. Developing an analysis set that includes all 
forms of downtime – logistics, administrative, preventative, 
and conditional-based maintenance should be completed 
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during system testing to ensure verification. These results can 
be compared to the requirements; recommending further 
improvements if necessary. As more data becomes available, 
these estimates can be used to further refine the number of 
maintenance personnel required to complete a repair. Proper 
training of personnel and optimizing spares inventory using 
top-rated contributors to unavailability of subsystems will 
keep repair times to a minimum. The RMA team will be an 
integral part of certifying ground systems to support launch.  
As GSDO moves forward to operations and sustainment, the 
RMA Team can use collected data from testing and 
verification to provide trending data, reliability growth 
opportunities, and implement a reliability-centered 
maintenance approach to sustaining long term performance 
of ground systems. 
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